Michigan Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 8

1942

CURRENT PHASES OF DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST
DIRECTORS
Ralph M. Carson
Member of the New York bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Ralph M. Carson, CURRENT PHASES OF DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST DIRECTORS, 40 MICH. L. REV.
1125 (1942).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol40/iss8/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
VoL. 40

JUNE, 1942

No. 8

CURRENT PHASES OF DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
AGAINST DIRECTORS*

Ralph M. Carsont

I

N assuming to discuss in this place some of the current phases of

stockholders' derivative actions against directors of corporations,
I shall try to keep a course between two extremes. On the one hand,
it is of little use to fulfill the easy duty of enunciating general rules
of law, stated in such a form that both parties in a contested cause may
equally invoke them. Nor, on the other hand, is it of much value to
fill an hour's time with details of cases recently decided which, although
interesting in themselves, resist general application. What I shall try
instead is to run over with you the main lines of decision emergtng from
recent derivative actions, using the facts for illustration only; and in
doing so I must bear in mind that I am speaking to an audience of
technicians. Indeed, I see among the audience some faces which have
appeared on the opposite and wrong side of the counsel table 1n some of
the suits which might arise for discussion here, in some that are pending; which perhaps will appear in others that may be only meditated.
Hence, anything I may say this evening must be subject to the caution
that it is wholly without prejudice. If the text of my remarks shall
appear hereafter in the brief of some future adversary on behaif at an
unexpected and ( needless to say) unjustified application to new facts,
then let it be understood that my future interpretation of this text will
be equally authoritative with the text itself.
Justice Rosenman pointed out in a lecture to the Practicing Law
Institute last January that the derivative action was first used in England in 1828. Lord Lyndhurst held that out of two hundred or more
shareholders in an iron and coal company five might properly bring a

*

Substance of remarks made April 7, 1942, at the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, on the program of the Committee on Post-Admission Legal Education.
A.B., J.D., Michigan; B.A., Oxford. Member of the New York bar.-'-Ed.
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repr-esentative action to replenish the common fund by compelling the
directors to restore thereto that part of ,£2 5,ooo witlidrawn to acquire
from one Flattery mines for which only £ro,ooo were paid.1 By 1855
the jurisdiction of equity to entertain such actions was fully established,
in the view of the United States Supreme Court; 2 and by 1882 that
Court, by rule embodying the former practice, laid down the requirements of contemporary ownership and prior demand for the bill in a
stockholder's action founded on rights which might properly 'be asserted by the corporation.8 The possible abuse of this form of action in
litigation brought "expressly to annoy and vex the company" was foreseen by the Supreme Court in 1884,4 and yet as late as 1896 President
Hadley of Yale was able to write:
" ... Perhaps the most serious among all the evils under which
American business suffers is the lack of clear understanding as to
directors' responsibilities." 5
The prominent member of the New York bar who recently recalled
to us this, state of affairs is among those who have done much to correct
it. Indeed it may not unreasonably be said that the correction has gone
too far. Strong support could be found for the view expressed by Dean
Pound in 1936 that stockholders' suits for mismanagement "have been
abused quite as much as the powers of directors they have·intended to restrain." 8 The number of such suits has greatly increased, and the size
and scale of some has increased even more. The English law on the
subject up to 19ro could be stated in a page of Halsbury's Laws of
England, with reference to twenty-nine decided cases. But in this country the precedents were many times more numerous even before 19 ro,
and the volume of this litigation continues to swell.
In consequence of this severe course of instruction, directors of
corporations are now so far from being in doubt as to their responsibilities as to have attained the learning of the English law student who
1 Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562 at 575-576, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828). It
does not appear that the corporation was a party. The next case seems to be Foss v.
Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843).
2 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 331 at 341 (1855).
8 Equity Rule 94, October Term 1881 (104 U. S. ix) carried into Equity Rule
27 of the Rules of 1912 and Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 Dimpfell v. Ohio & M. Ry., I IO U. S. 209 at 210, 3 S. Ct. 573 (1884). This
was not an action against directors.
5 Quoted by David L. Podell in lecture of November 25, 1940, to the Practicing
Law Institute, New York.
8 Pound, "Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity," 49 HARV. L.
REV. 369 at 395 (1936).
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sought a certificate for having read in the chambers of a barrister. He
was refused because the record showed that the student had appeared in
chambers only twice during the whole year. He pleaded, however, that
he had learned a great deal by reading the barrister's opinions. Asked
what he had read,
" 'Well, the first time I read a long opinion of yours on the
liabilities of executors,' said the student.
'"Well, what did I say?' asked the barrister.
"'I don't exactly remember,' replied the student, 'but I do
remember that when I had finished reading it I said to myself:
''Well, I'm blest if I'll ever be an executor."'
"'And what did you learn the next time?' asked the barrister.
" 'Well, I read a long opinion of your on the liabilities of
trustees.'
"'And what did I say?'
"'Well, I don't exactly remember,' replied the student, 'but I
do remember when I had finished reading it I said to myself,
''Well, I'm blowed if I'll ever be a trustee." '
"'Sir,' said the barrister earnestly, 'You shall have your certificate. Your answers show that you have acquired a sound and
discriminating knowledge of the principles of equity, which,
whether you become a barrister or not, will be of the greatest value
to you throughout the rest of your 'life.' " 1
While this may well be the state of mind of honest directors unable
to see the value of those prerogatives of the legal profession which permit a claim to be asserted first and the basis for its assertion later ascertained by a protracted interrogation of defendants having other and
more legitimate calls upon their time and energies; while it is also
difficult for laymen unaware of the economic basis of the legal profession to see the necessity for indefinite multiplication of suits by different stockholders against the same directors on the same matter 8in spite of these grounds of misunderstanding of the law by the world
of corporate business, nevertheless certain other ,things are also clear.
It is clear that the stockholder's derivative suit is an absolutely necessary arm of equity jurisdiction and that, when used with justice and
restraint, it has both public and private value. It is clear too that the
Quoted by CREW, THE WHOLE DuTY OF A DIRECTOR 4 (1929).
Thirteen separate suits have now been brought against directors of the United
States Rubber Company upon its bonus plan and certain preferred dividends. Twenty
suits are pending, in consolidated form, against directors of Radio Corporation of
America, many of them stimulated by an offer of settlement.
1

8
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courts are developing and do continually apply rules of decision by
which honest directors e;xercising their own judgment with reasonable
care on matters of choice and judgment in the corporate affairs, within
the restrictions of its charter and not in violation of positive statutory
restriction, are in no danger of accountability in actions of this type.
The very nature of the form of action as a device of equity to compel
compliance by directors with their obligations insures acceptance by the
courts of the consequences of honest business judgment.
I propose this evening to outline briefly the business judgment rule,
and then to examine the exceptions thereto and certain applications
thereof, all as illustrated by recent cases. If time remains I will in conclusion refer to recent developments in practice involved in the presentation of these questions.

I
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

A good statement of the· business judgment rule applicable to the
actions of directors of a corporation was made by the Cou~t of Appeals
in ·1890 in Gamble v. Queens County Water Co.: 9
"I think that where the action of the majority is plainly a
fraud upon, or, in other words, is really oppressive to the minority
shareholders, and the' directors or trustees ~have acted with and
formed part of the major:ity, an action may be sustained _by one of
the minority shareholders suing in his own behalf and in that of
all others coming in, etc., to enjoin the action contemplated, and in
which action the corporation should be made a party defendant. It
is not, however, every question of mere administration or of pqlicy
in which there is a difference of opinion among the shareholders
that enables the minority to claim that the action of the majority
is oppressive, and which justifies the minority in coming to a court
of equity to obtain relief. Generally, the rule must be that in such
cases the will of the majority shall govern. The court would not be
justified in interfering even in doubtful cases, where the action of
the majority might be susceptible of different constructions. To
warrant the interposition of the court in favor of the minority
shareholders in a corporation or joint-stock association, as against
the contemplated action of the majority, where such action is
within the corporate powers, a case must be made out which plainly
shows that such· action is so far opposed to the true interests of the
9

123 N. Y. 91 at 98; 25 N. E. 2or (1890).
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corporation itself as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus
acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure
such interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the
company and in a manner inconsistent with its interests. Otherwise
the court might be called upon to balance probabilities of profitable
results to arise from the carrying out of the one or the other of
different plans proposed by or on behalf of different shareholders
in a corporation, and to decree the adoption of that line of policy
which seemed to it to promise the best results, or at least to enjoin
the carrying out of the opposite policy. This is no business for any
court to follow."
While the corporate action there sought to be impeached was taken by
stockholders, the same principle applies in favor of the action of directors acting for stockholders. As was said by Justice Cardozo at Special
Term in New York County,
" ... A contract made by a corporation within the scope of its
chartered powers may not be set aside merely because some stockholders believe it to be unwise. There must be either fraud or conduct so manifestly oppressive as to be equivalent to fraud. [ citations] No charge of fraud is made. There is no claim that the price
of 90 was fixed by the directors with any furtive purpose to benefit
themselves or to despoil the company. There is not even a claim
that any better price could be obtained. There is merely the assertion of the plaintiffs' disagreement with the directors as to the
expediency of the transactions. [citations] Because of this diversity
of view, the court is asked to revise the judgment of the directors,
and substitute its conclusion for theirs. In the language of Peckham, J., in Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., ... 'This is no
business for any court to follow.'" 10
On this basis the court refused to set aside a contract between the corporation and its bankers for the issuance of corporate notes to be purchased by the bankers at ninety, together with certain options and other
clauses.
In a recent decision of the United States District Court for Delaware granting summary judgment to directors of a holding company
charged in a stockholders' derivative action with responsibility for ex10 Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 84 Misc. •278 at 283, 147 N. Y. S. 104
(1913), affd. on opinion below, 163 App. Div. 885, 147 N. Y. S. IIl7 (1914). The
q\lotation from the Gamble ·case is from 123 N. Y. 91 at 99. See also a good statement
in Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N. Y. 113 at 124, 100 N. E. 721 (1913).
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orbitant expenditures, the federal court stated the rule in terms of a
New Jersey decision as follows:

" ... In a purely business corporation ... the authority of the
directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation must be
regarded as absolute 'when they act within the law, and the court
is without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the
directors'?;
and in terms of a Delaware case, as follows:
" ... it is not their [ the courts'] function to resolve for corporations
questions of policy and business management. The directors are
chosen to pass upon such questions and their judgment unless
shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final. The judgment
of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of a presumption
~at it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the
best interests of the corporation they serve." 11 · ·
The common-sense basis of such a rule was indicated recently by
Justice Collins at Special Term in New York County:

" ... If every time a stockholder disagreed with the wisdom or
good judgment of the directors as to purchases made or prices
paid, &c., he could successfully maintain a stockholders' action, corporate businesses would soon be managed and run by the courts
instead of the directors, to whom the law intrusts their management." 12
This rule is one of constant application. It was most recently invoked by the Appellate Division, First Department, in reversing by a
bare majority the trial court's judgment for an accounting at the suit
of a stockholder.18
The basis of the rule is, of course, that the matters confided to the
determination of corporate directors are matters of choice and discretion, resting in sound policy based upon their knowledge of the business, so that within the limits of personal honesty an~ statutory law the
11 Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (D. C. Del. 1941) 41 F. Supp.
334 at 339, qu9ting Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 N. J. Eq. I at
2.1, 187 A. 540 (1936), and Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157 at
169, 142 A. 654 (1928).
12 Wind v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, N. Y. L. J. June 21, 1938,
p. 2988: 7, not officially reported.
13 Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97 at
130, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941), reversing 174 Misc. 601, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 651
(1940).
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determination is for the directors alone. They are not in the position of
trustees of an express trust, but are fiduciary agents. While trustees of
an express trust are personally liable for losses arising from an infraction of their trust deed, regardless of good faith, directors are not so
liable if acting in good faith and with due care.14 Notwithstanding a
corporate director is tantamount to a trustee with respect to the quality
of his duty, since he is held "in official action, to the extreme measure of
candor, unselfishness and good faith." 15
In the application of this rule corporate directors are aided by the
presumption that their action on behalf of the corporation has been
honest and proper. As was said at Special Term in a recent case granting
summary judgment to directors of a corporation, "the presumption
that the directors acted honestly and in good faith must prevail," in
the absence of proof by the complaining stockholders that ulterior purpose or self-interest motivated their action.16

II
ExcEPTIONs TO BusrnEss JunGMENT RuLE; AREAS oF
N ONAPPLICATION
Since the statement of the general principle does not mean much
without an understanding of its exclusions and inclusions, I shall now
take up matters to which the business judgment rule does not apply,
and discuss in turn fraud, domination of directors by outside parties,
ultra vires and the like, the corporate opportunity cases, and negligence.
Also to be considered under this heading is a spurious exception continually invoked by counsel for minority stockholders by virtue of
which the directors are accused of negligence and inattention because
they are not fortunate enough to have minds that work in the same way
as the minds of plaintiff's counsel.
u Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at 699,
discussing Matter of Smith, 279 N. Y. 479 at 489, 18 N. E. (2d) 666 (1938). To
the same effect see Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App.
Div. 97 at 123, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941).
15 Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185 at 193, 123 N. E. 148
(1919); Turner v. American Metal Co., Special Term N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J.,
March 5, 1942, p. 966:3, not yet officially reported; Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec.
Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at 677.
16 Diamond v. Davis, Jr., Special Term N. Y. County, Hammer, J., N. Y. L. J.
Feb. 14, 1942, p. 686: I at 4, not yet officially reported. See also Rathbone v. Ayer,
196 N. Y. 503, 89 N. E. 1111 (1909), adopting dissenting opinion below, 121
App. Div. 355 at 362, 105 N. Y. S. 1041 (1907); Cleary v. Higley, 154 Misc.
158 at 170, 277 N. Y. S. 63 (1935), affd. 246 App. Div. 698, 284 N. Y. S. 989
(1935), leave to appeal denied, 270 N. Y. 673 (1936).
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A. Fraud
It is of the very essence of the business judgment rule that it cannot apply to cases in which the directors of a corporation are guilty of
fraud or similar action taken in their own interest and adversely to the
corporate interest. In the vivid language which the English judges
use:,· "the director is really a watch-dog, and the watch-dog has no right,
without the knowledge of his master, to 'take a sop from a possible
wolf." 17 The kind of fraud which imposes liability upon a· director is,
in the language of the same judge, playing "ducks and drakes with
the company's property"; it is real fraud, either positive deception or
concrete breach of fiduciary duty. It is not enough for plaintiffs to
charge directors· with fraud "adverbially," as a recent decision on summary' judgment put it.18 Curiously enough, and I believe your own
observation will bear me out, the attribution of fraud adverbially to corporate directors is the main ingredient of complaints in minority stockholders' action~ Yet in very few of these actions in which the plaintiffs
have succeeded has fraud either actual or constructive been found.
B.

Directors Subject to Outside Domination

Another obvious exception to the business judgment rule arises
where· the directors have not exercised their own judgment but have
submitted to the domination and control of others; and again, curiously
enough, such an allegation is a fayorite staple of minority stockholders'
complaints. This allegation also is usually not the ground of recovery
where there has been recovery. The outside bankers were held not to
have dominated the directors in the Guaranty Trust Company case, nor
to have dominated the directors in th·e St. Louis-San Francisco Railway
Company case, nor to have dominated the directors in the Hoe & Co.
case; nor was the supposedly dominant stockholder found to have controlled the directors in the General Motors case or in the United States
Rubber Company case. 19

J.,

17

Bowen, L.

in In re North Australian Territory Co., [1892] 1 Ch. 322 at

18

Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (D. C. Del. 1941) 41 F. Supp.

341.
334.
19 Reference is made respectively to Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term,
1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at 691, 721, 736; Lonsdale v. Speyer, 174 Misc. 532,
19 N. Y. S. (2d) 746 (1938), a:ffd. 259 App. Div. 802, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 773
(1940), motion for leave to appeal denied 259 App. Div. 863, 20 N. Y; S. (2d) 399
(.19,t.Q}, a:ffd. -284 N. Y. 752, 31 N. E. (2d) 512 (1940); Chance v. Guaranty Trust
Co., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 412; Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.~
(D~ C. N. Y. May 23, 1941), Leibell, J., not yet reported;, Diamond v. Davis, Spe-.
cial Term N. Y. County, N. Y. L J. Feb. 14, 1942, p. 686:1.
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A main ground of decision in the Blaustein case was the finding of
the trial court that the majority stockholder of Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company dominated the action of the directors
through its nominees on the board; and it was· this finding which the
Appellate Division by a bare majority reversed. The question here was
a close one, and it may be worth-while to look at the reasoning of the
appellate court. Justice Dore for the majority said:
"In the final analysis, the trial court seemed to rest its decision
on what it referred to as the frailities of human nature. The court
said it was inconsistent with 'all human experience' that when
Seubert, Barkdull and Stephens walked into a Pan Am board
meeting they could forget they were directing heads of Indiana.
The issue, however, in each case is not to be decided on general
views of human nature but on the particular facts established in
each case showing the type, character, standing, experience, integrity, ability and the action taken by the particular directors
involved....
"On this record, we hold plaintiffs have failed to establish by
a preponderance of the credible testimony that Indiana, as majority .stockholder, so usurped the functions of the board of directors
of Pan Am in the transactions attacked that they failed to exercise
their independent judgment in good faith. . ..
"The directors here attacked were first rate men of outstanding experience, ability and recognized character individually and
as officers of the oil business in the United States. Neither in the prolonged examinations before trial nor in the direct or cross-examinations at trial was anything established to impugn their integrity,
competency or ability. Nothing was adduced to show that any of
them, including McKeever, who was never connected with Indiana,
and Carroll, who was never an Indiana director or officer, were not
acting with an honest desire to serve the corporation's interest." 20
At the time of the transaction in question Indiana held ninety-six
per cent of the stock of Pan-American and had nominated six of the
nine members of Pan-American's board, four of these six being directors of Indiana. With reference to the relationship thus shown the trial
court, Justice Rosenman, had said:
"This interlocking set-up, alone, had all the potentialities of
domination and control by Indiana. It would have been almost
20 Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97 at
122, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 964 (1941), reversing 174 Misc. 601 at 659, 662, 21 N. Y. S.
(2d) 651 (1940).
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contrary to normal assumptions to expect that when a conflict in
interest between Indiana and Pan Am arose, these six men would
have divorced _themselves from consideration of the welfare of
Indiana and would. have concentrated wholly on the interest of
Pan Am. Relationships, such as these men bore to the dominant
corporation, are re<c1lities motivating business conduct, which looni
up clearly to any one intent on looking through the fog of intercorporate artificialities." 21
The Blaustein case is expected to be argued in the Court of Appeals
this autumn, and the decision of that court will be of interest as indicating how concrete the proof must be on a close issue of fact w~th
reference to asserted outside domination over corporate directors: Regardless of the proper solution of the question of fact presented in that
particular case, it would seem that the majority opinion is right in holding that "the fiduciary theory will not be employed merely to enable
a minority to dictate corporate policies." 22
It is usually said that, where the possibility of domination of corporate directors by an outside party is shown, then the outside party
becomes potentially a fiduciary and must, together with the directors,
assume the burden of proof to justify the action in question. This was
the basis of the decision of the trial court in the Blaustein case and,
while not questioned as a matter of p,rinciple by the Appellate Division,
did not prevent a reversal on the same facts. If shown by concrete proof
to have dominated a board of directors, a third party becomes a fiduciary
accountable together with them. Such was the situation, in part at least,
in two cases recently decided, viz. one in California on behalf of stockholders of Hearst Consolidated Publications, and one in a United States
District Court for Pennsylvania involving Pennroad Corporation. In the
California case holders of stock in Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc.
sought, in an action against its directors, 'William Randolph Hearst and
various corporations controlled by Mr. Hearst directly or indirectly,
to review transactions leading up to the formation of Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc. in 1930 and numerous intercompany transactions thereafter. While fi11ding no fraud in any of these transactions
and good faith in most, the Superior Court of the State of California
for Los Angeles County found liability in certain transactions between
the corporations of which plaintiffs were stockholders and other corporations owned directly or indirectly by the defendants and having
control through stock ownership of plaintiffs' corporation. The court
based its findings of liability upon the absence of evidence of arms'21

174 Misc. 601'at 662.

22

263 App. Div. 97 at I 22.
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length dealing in intercompany transactions. It refused to make a general finding of domination of Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc.,
in all intercompany relationships, by Mr. Hearst and others, saying:
" ... A finding of domination cannot be based upon a psychologic or legalistic theory. I do not believe, as the stockholders
appear to, that directors live in some state of mental and moral
anemia, with no minds of their own, and consequently are subservient to the appointing power, or that domination is presumed
to go with the power of appointment. Stockholders frequently
combine to elect directors in order to assure their corporation of
honest and independent management. That, I believe, is their
usual purpose in combining." 28

In the Pennroad case, which was an action by holders of Yoting
trust certificates of Pennroad Corporation against its former directors
and the Pennsylvania Railroad, a federal court for Pennsylvania found
on the evidence that the Pennroad Corporation was organized by the
railroad, furnished with directors who were also cl.irectors of the railroad, and used as an instrumentality of the railroad in the transactions
in which liability was found. 24
It is noteworthy that in both these cases the court found good faith
of the corporate directors to have little relevance, once concrete facts
had been established from which flowed the conclusions of domination
and control of the corporate directors from outside. In California Judge
Shinn said that the bases of liability were unfairness and the use of
fiduciary influence, and that good faith was not in the circumstances the
ultimate test. In Pennsylvania Judge Welsh, having determined liability in certain of the transactions, disclaimed any purpose to impugn
the personal honor of the defendants and said:
" ... The chancellor hopes no unkind conclusions will be drawn
from these findings because he asserts with all positiveness no such
conclusions are warranted." 25
C. Ultra Vires and Violation of Statute
Where the action of the directors of a corporation is outside the
corporate powers, necessarily there is no room for the principle that
they are protected in the exercise of the discretion confided to them by
the stockholders. Nevertheless, in the absence of some adverse personal
Mann v. Hearst, Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, Sept. 1941,
not yet reported.
H Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., (D. C. Pa. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 586.
25 Id. at 630.

28

Shinn,

J.,
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interest on the part of directors or plain notice that they are exceeding
their powers, it would seem probable that they. are not liable for corporate action purely on the ground of ultra vires. In the transaction in
the Guaranty Trust Company case in which Justice Shientag imposed
liability, he expressly refused to rest such liability upon his finding that
the transaction ( a purchase of bonds by a New York bank with an option
to the seller to repurchase them at the same price in six months) was outside the corporate powers, a finding which the court observed did not
rest upon any case directly in point.26 The same conclusion was reached
with reference to the asserted illegal payment of dividends of the
United States Rubber Company, by Justice Hammer, in the absence of
evidence of bad faith and negligence. 27
I believe no authority will be found for holding corporate directors
liable for honest action on their part taken without negligence outside
the corporate powers, despite the fact that in many cases liability of
directors for ultra vires acts has been asserted by way of dictum and
sometimes imposed. Where it has been imposed, it will be found that
the actions condemned were so grossly negligent as not to be consistent
with an honest mistake of judgment. However, where the action of
directors is taken in violation of a statutory direction or prohibition,
then it probably results in liability on their part to the extent of any loss
to the corporation, regardless of their good faith. It has been so held in
a case involving violation of investment clauses of the New York Insurance Law,28 and in a case of loans made by a state bank in violation of the
New York Banking Law.29 Likewise with respect to .the rate of dividends
permitted by the position of a company's capital account, an external
standard is supplied by the law, and the exercise of honest business judgment in another direction is probably not a protection against liability. In
the action brought against former directors of Bush Terminal Company
in respect of dividends, Justice Walter found that the valuations of the
assets justified the dividends. However, he said that the business
judgment rule did not apply to its full extent and that:
" ... When directors have in fact exercised an informed judgment with respect to the value of the company's assets, the courts
26

Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at 699,

696.
27 Diamond v. Davis Jr., Special Term, N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 14,
1942, p. 686:1.
28 Van Schaick v. Carr, 170 Misc. 539 at 543, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 567 (1939),
citing Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 at 83, 40 S. Ct. 82 (1_920).
29 Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N. Y. S. 455 (1934).
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obviously will be exceedingly slow to override that judgment, and
clear and convincing evidence will be required to justify a finding
that such judgment was not in accordance with the facts. In the
last analysis, however, the issue, in any case in which it is claimed
that dividends have been paid out of capital, is the value of the
assets and the amount of the liabilities to creditors and stockholders at the times the dividends were declared and paid." 30

D. Diversions of Corporate Opportunity
The rule which requires the director of a corporation to manage its
affairs with the highest degree of fidelity and single-mindedness not
only prevents him from taking money out of the till but makes him
liable for any profits earned by him personally from the exploitation of
an opportunity or expectancy to which, under all the circumstances, the
corporation had the superior right. In the easily recognized language
of Justice Cardozo, a trustee ( which a corporate director is in respect
of the quality of his duty) is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place; his standard must be not honesty alone, "but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"; and equity will meet with
uncompromising rigidity any attempt "to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions." 31
While plaintiff stockholders have shown a strong affinity for these
phrases, the courts have in their application to the practical problems
of corporate management looked sharply at the question whether the
opportunity for profit was one which, as a matter of equity, did belong
to the corporation. In Hauben v. /11.orris,32 minority stockholders of
Industrial Finance Corporation sought to hold directors liable for the
profits of the sale by them to the corporation of debenture stock thereof
which it had previously sold to a third party subject to a repurchase
agreement. Before retirement of the stock the third party sold it to a
syndicate composed of defendant directors, instead of to the corporation;
the defendants sold to the corporation at the specified redemption price;
and the profits claimed in the action were the premium and the accrued
dividends. The trial court held the defendants liable for these profits.
so Randall v. Bailey, (N. Y. Co. 1940) 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 at 185 (1940),
affd. 262 App. Div. 844, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 512 (1941).
31
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 at 464, 164 N. E. 545 (1928), citing
Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439 at 444, 154N. E. 303 (1926). Both these cases involved relationships of personal trust, not corporate management.
32
255 App. Div. 35, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 721 (1938), reversing 161 Misc. 174,
291 N. Y. S. 96 (1936), affd. 281 N. Y. 652, 22 N. E. (2d) 482 (1939).
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The Appellate Division reversed, finding upon an analysis of the facts
that the third party might well not have sold to the corporation and that
earlier redemption of the stock might not have been to the corporate
interest. The conclusion was that the directors are not trustees for the
corporation in such a case unless the circumstances imposed upon them
a "mandate" to buy for the corporation. The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.
Great stimulus to claims of diversion of corporate opportunity in
minority stockholders' cases was given by the success of such a claim in
the Delaware case involving Loft, Inc. According to the findings, the
president of the corporation there knew that it needed a cola drink and
had under consideration the purchase of Pepsi-Cola for that purpose;
the opportunity to acquire Pepsi-Cola was actually tendered to the corporation, but rejected; thereupon the Pepsi-Cola business was acquired
by the president privately and developed by him through the use of the
corporate facilities in very great part.83 This would seem a strong case,
and the language of the Delaware court imposing liability under those
circumstances, which is the language of general fiduciary obligation,
cannot be applied without change to different facts.
As Hauben v. Morris indicates; the New York court has been
critical of claims based upon alleged diversion of corporate opportunity.
In the suit against the National City Bank directors, the defendants
were held not liable to the corporation for a profit made by them personally on the acquisition of portions of a new stock issue purchased by
National, City Company from the issuer and sold by it to a private list
including the defendants, where a profit was made both by National
City Company and by some of the directors. Justice Dore pointed out
that there was no proof that the company could have made a larger
profit and no indication that its own transaction was impaired.84 In the
case against directors of Guaranty Trust Company and Guaranty Company, a similar conclusion was reached by the court in a similar transaction which differed principally in that the defendant directors bought
their stock directly from the same bankers who sold to Guaranty Company for the purpose of public issue. His discussion of the evidence
emphasizes that the offering made by Guaranty Company was as large
as it could handle and that the defendant directors did not compete
with it in the market. 85
38 Loft, Inc. v. Guth, (Del. Ch. 1938) 2 A. (2d) 225, affd. Guth v. Loft,' Inc.,
(Del. Ch. 1939) 5 A. (2d) 503.
8 ~ Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679 at 698, 273 N. Y. S. 87 (1934).
85 Litwin v. Ailen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at
679-691.
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On this question of the proprietary right of the corporation in a
business opportunity, one of the closest issues which has been drawn
was drawn in the Blaustein case to which I have so frequently referred.
There the judgment of the trial court to the effect that the directors of
Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company had, under the
domination of the majority stockholder, deprived it in favor of that
stockholder of various facilities necessary for an effective economic
performance by the corporation, rested on the substantial basis of a
contract made February 17,- 1933, between the corporation and the
majority stockholder to which the plaintiffs were parties.86 Holding the
majority stockholder to have become a fiduciary of Pan-American by
reason of its domination, the trial court took this agreement as the
measure of the corporation's right as seen by the parties at the time,
and enforced this right, in certain particulars, not because the individual directors profited personally but because they appropriated for
the majority stockholder certain transactions and profits held to belong
to the corporation. The majority in the Appellate Division disagreed
with this view. Despite the 1933 contract, the Appellate Division
pointed out that the action was brought by the plaintiffs, not to enforce
the contract, but to punish a breach of trust, and held that the agreement could not deprive the directors of their "duty to manage the corporation in the exercise of their own judgment and discretion in the
light of facts and conditions faced when they were called upon to act."
Even if the objects stated in the contract seemed to the parties the best
course at the time, said the court:
". . . neither that agreement nor any other contract between such
parties could be made the inflexible rule of corporate policy from
which directors could not deviate without breach of duty. Corporate management is vested by law in the corporation's dire<::tors
and no such contract can bind directors to predestined action irrespective of their own judgment and discretion." 87
The essential conflict in this situation between the doctrine of
diversion of corporate opportunity and the business judgment rule is
shown in the conclusion of the Appellate Division:

"· .. In the final analysis on the facts disclosed, the decree substitutes the court's judgment for that of the directors and in its
present form draws the court more and more deeply into the
directorial management of the oil business, balancing the proba36
Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 174 Misc. 601 at 618622, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 651 (1940).
87
Same case, 263 App. Div. 97 at 108, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941).
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bilities of profitable results, decreeing those which seem to the
court to promise best results where there is a difference of opinion
between minority and majority directors, and enjoining others.
No case has been made out which plainly shows that the action
taken was 'so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself
as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have
been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests, but
that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some outside
purpose, regardless of the consequences to the company and in a
manner inconsistent with its interests."" 38
Essential to this conclusion, of course, were the findings that the individual defendants made no personal profit, that they acted in good
faith, and that the majority stockholder did not dominate the corporation.
A well-known case in which liability has been imposed upon directors for diversion of corporate opportunity is Irving Trust Co. v.
Deutsch. 30 A substantial block of stock in a company owning patents
essential to the business of the corporation involved was offered to the
corporation, rejected for lack of funds, and thereafter acquired by certain directors personally. It was held that their profits in the transaction belonged to the corporation. Although the directors sought to
arrange that the corporation might have' the benefits intended by its
own originally contemplated purchase, and although the finding of the
trial court that the corporation could not afford the purchase was left
undisturbed, nevertheless the rule of undivided loyalty seemed to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals to require surrender of the
profits. But the bankers who had proposed the transaction to the corporation, and then carried it out with the defendants, were held not
liable to account, since they had the right to sell to whomever they
could. This decision was rather close to the line, and has not been followed by the New Yark courts in situations of comparable difficulty on
their own facts. 40 In so far as the rule of Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch
is more severe than that of the state courts, it should no longer govern
88
Id., 263 App. Div. at 130, quoting Gamble v. Queens County Water Co.,
123 N. Y. 91 at 99, 25 N. E. 201 (1890).
39
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 121, reversing (D. C. N. Y. 1932) 2 F.
Supp. 971; cert. denied, Irving Trust Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U. S. 708, 55
S. Ct. 405 (1935).
40
It is distinguished in Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co.,
263 App. Div. 97 at 120, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941), and in Litwin v. Allen,
(N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at 687; it is disregarded in
Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N. Y., S. (2d) 721 (1938), although cited
below, 161 Misc. 174 at 181, 291 N. Y. S. 96 (1936).
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in actions in the New York federal courts, by virtue of the rule in Erie
R. R. 'V. Tompkins.'u
The theory of diversion of corporate opportunity underlies a very
recent decision by Justice Shientag involving directors of the American
Metal Company, Ltd. 42 This was a derivative suit on behalf of the
Metal Company against directors and officers for diversion to their own
profit of the development and operation of a molybdenum mine at
Climax, Colorado. The Metal Company, among other things, bought
and sold the base metals, copper, zinc and lead, but until the transactions in suit had not been interested in molybdenum. An offer of a
new source of molybdenum was made to the corporation, and it signed
contracts for the acquisition thereof and advanced money for the development of the enterprise. When the enterprise was entered upon,
the participation therein for the company was fixed at seventy per cent
and thirty per cent for the management. At some time in r 9 r 7 this
ratio was changed so that the company had but ten per cent and the
management ninety per cent; proportionate stock interests were assigned to the company and to the directors upon the incorporation of
Climax Molybdenum Company in r9r8; the success of the Climax
Company was uneven, but from 1934 on it made phenomenal profits.
In applying the doctrine of corporate opportunity, Justice Shientag
pointed out that the rule is clear where the property involved is essential to the existence of the corporation, but that greater difficulty arises
where the property is merely one in which the corporation "has an
interest or tangible expectancy." 43 As guides to determine whether the
corporation has an interest or tangible expectancy in any property or
venture so as to make it a corporate opportunity, the court suggested
that the following circumstances, among others, have to be considered: 44
"r. The nature of the property involved, whether it was
unique or of special value or something that could be acquired by
anyone in the market.
"2. Whether or not it was within the scope and line of business of the corporation.
¾1 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938); West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 3II U.S. 223 at 236, 61 S. Ct. 179 (1940).
42 Turner v. American Metal Co., Special Term, N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J- ►
March 5, 1942, p. 966:3.
°'8 In the language of Dore, J., in Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97 at 125, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941).
44 Turner v. American Metal Co., Special Term, N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J.,.
March 5, 1942, p. 966:3 at 6.
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"3. The manner in which the opportunity came to the officer
or director-whether in his official or in his individual capacity.
"4. The :financial ability and the adequacy of the facilities and
resources of the corporation to acquire and exploit the enterprise.
"S. The actual use of the funds and resources of the corporation in the acquisition and development of the corporation.
"6. Whether or not the officer or director acted in good faith,
in the interests of the corporation, or whether he was guided by his
own personal advantage."
The opinion shows that a substantial factor in the court's conclusion
was the defendants' use of the name, good will and connections of the
American Metal Company in developing their enterprise, which was
thus developed at the expense of the corporation, much like the development of the Pepsi-Cola business in the Guth case.

E. Negligence of Directors
Directors naturally cannot avail themselves of the business judgment rule where they have not in fact exercised any judgment at all on
the point in controversy. Thus in the Hearst Consolidated Publications
case the California court felt obliged to set aside the acquisition by the
corporation of certain newspapers from a corporation controlled by
Mr. Hearst, because of excessiveness of price and lack of arms'-length
dealing, despite the fact that the directors were shown by the minutes
to have approved the transaction. Said the court:
"Ordinarily this fact would have great weight, but in this case
it has but little. There were important facts which the directors
did not know. They had made no investigation of values. They
did not know of the seriousness of the situation caused by the
advances and loans that had been made upstream and of the increasing difficulty on that account; ... They had at best an imperfect knowledge that they were purchasing papers that had been
sustaining heavy losses for many years or of what those losses had
been." 45
Similarly directors are not exonerated in the exercise of even a
disinterested business judgment if they have been careless-have failed
to exercise the prudence and degree of care which would be exercised in
the circumstances by a reasonable man protecting his own interests.
Thus the directors of Reynolds, Investing Company were held respon45 Mann v. Hearst, Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County,
Sept. 1941, page 203 of memorandum opinion of Shinn J., not yet reported.
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sible for the extraordinary frauds perpetrated by third parties upon the
corporation through the device of acquiring their stock and using their
portfolio of securities to pay the purchase price, where the directors
themselves disposed of their stock to the same third parties at a price
held to be excessive and an essential feature of the bargain was the
immediate resignation of the directors and officers. Conceding that
majority stockholders have a right to sell their stock even though such
a sale ultimately brings about a change in the directorate, considering
also that officers and directors have a right to resign their posts, Justice
Walter nevertheless found that these circumstances together with excessive price charged the directors and officers with notice of the intention of the purchasers to loot the corporation.
The court called attention to the fact that by their resignations the
officers and directors of the company placed in the control of their successors the custody and possession of negotiable securities of a value
twice the agreed purchase price. He said:
". . . For fiduciaries confronted with such a realization, I
gravely doubt whether it is sufficient that they truthfully can say
they actually knew nothing against the character of the purchasers
or of their nominees, or even that they had affirmative evidence
that the purchasers were of good reputation. A man dealing with
his own affairs may be as confiding and trusting as he pleases, and
may be grossly negligent without being guilty of bad faith; but a
fiduciary charged with the care of the property of others must be
reasonably vigilant, and will not be heard to say that he did not
know what the circumstances plainly indicated or that his faith in
people was such that obvious opportunities for wrongdoing gave
him no inkling that wrongdoing might be done, and schemes to
acquire the stock of corporations by using assets of the corporation
to pay the purchase price did not originate in the year 1937."'8
Similarly in the Guaranty Trust Company case the court found
negligence in one of the transactions attacked despite the fact that two
of the defendants held liable had as members of a private banking firm
entered into the same transaction for their own account in an even larger
amount, and thus given the best possible proof that their decision as
directors was made with the same care that they gave to their own
affairs. The transaction was a purchase of Missouri Pacific bonds with
an option to the seller to buy them back at the same price within six
months, the bonds in the meantime yielding five and one-half per cent
48

653.

Gerdes v. Reynolds, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1941) 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 622 at
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to the purchaser. They fell in price during the six months, the option to
repurchase was not exercised, and Guaranty Trust Company sustained
a loss through its wholly-owned subsidiary Guaranty Company. The
imposition of liability in these circumstances, despite substantial evidence in the testimony of the defendants as to the factors which they
considered made the transaction a prudent one, and despite the acquisition of the same securities on the same terms by two defendants for
their own account, has sometimes been said to indicate the development
of a doctrine of negligence per se. I do not think this is the case. Analysis of the facts will show that the court concluded the transaction to be
ultra vires the corporation, the form of transaction was conceded to be
a unique one, and there was no evidence that counsel had been consulted. Perhaps also the view that directors of a banking corporation
are required to exercise a higher degree of diligence than other directors·
had something to do with the result. 47 Where on the other hand it
appeared from an analysis of the deliberations of the directors' executive committee that proper attention had been given to all relevant
factors, the same court exonerated the defendants in respect of their
approval of certain banking loans, even though the loans were unusual
in character and ultimately resulted in large losses.
The degree of care which will be held an adequate discharge of a
director's duty of course varies with the circumstances. In sustaining
the action of directors of Guaranty Trust Company, Justice Shientag
reviewed in detail statistical material and considerations of policy which
came before the directors in connection with a loan made in 1930 and a
public auction in 1935 of the collateral securing the loan. Each of these
was a complicated transaction.48 A less detailed showing would probably
be sufficient. In sustaining the action of the directors of St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway Company in voting to acquire shares of the Chicago
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. in 1926, Justice Valente first dealt
with the charge that the directors were under the domination of the
chairman of the board, and then said:
" ... It is true that the directors did not individually make
excessive statistical examination into the wisdom of the purchase.
They did, however, pass upon the broad question of policy and
use their independent judgment." 49
47 Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spex. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at
699; Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413 at 418, 272 N. Y. S. 455 (1934).
48 Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N .Y. S. (2d) 667 at 706737.
49 Lonsdale v. Speyer, 174 Misc. 532 at 542, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 746 (1938),
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The point of time at which the actions of directors must be looked
at in order to determine whether or not they exercised judgment with
due care is of course the time at which they acted, not some subsequent
time. This rule is universally applied. It has been well said that a wisdom developed after an event, and having it and its consequences as a
source, is a standard no man should be judged by; 50 and that, while
prescience is always desirable, the failure to foresee what at best is
uncertain does not give rise to liability. 51 The uniform application of the
rule, however, does not prevent minority stockholder plaintiffs from
adopting with equal regularity the other view, and attacking corporate
action on the basis of hindsight. In the epilogue to War and Peace,
Tolstoi explains that the development of causation in history requires
you to know how things turned out before you can find out what preceding events are significant; and I suppose that directors of corporations cannot claim to be exempt from the kind of thinking which is
used to explain Napoleon.
For the honor of the profession, it is valuable to know that a finding of negligence or due care in the action of directors will sometimes
turn on whether they have consulted counsel. Weight was given to the
advice of counsel by Justice Froessel in finding directors not liable
in respect of a friendly receivership proceeding which was the basis of
complaint in the Hoe case; 52 and by the Appellate Division, Second
Department, in sustaining the action of the directors of National Investors Corporation in settling a suit brought against it; 53 and by
Justice Hammer in holding the directors of United States Rubber
Company not liable in respect of a stock option plan for employees or of
a bonus plan for employees; 54 and by the California court in sustaining
certain transactions between Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc. and
Star Holding Company, in the former of which the defendant W.R.
Hearst had a substantial interest and the latter of which was wholly
affd. 259 App. Div. 802, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 773 (1940), motion for leave to appeal
denied 259 App. Div. 863, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 399 (1940), affd. 284 N. Y. 752,
31 N. E. (2d) 512 (1940).
5
°CosteJlo v. Costello, 209 N. Y. 252 at 262, 103 N. E. 148 (1913).
51
Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at
727, Shientag, ]., citing cases.
52
Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 412 at
419.
53
Holland v. Presley, 255 App. Div. 667 at 669, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 804 (1939),
affd. 280 N. Y. 835, 21 N. E. (2d) 884 (1939).
H Diamond v. Davis, Jr., Special Term N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 14,
1942, p. 686:1.
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owned by him. 55 While critical of loose practice in the handling of
interest on intercompany transactions, Judge Shinn sustained the defendant directors in respect of them because of the approval of counsel.
He said:
"l have held that when Consolidated became Star's banker, banking methods should have been adopted and in a loose fashion they
were. Perhaps Mr. Neylan was not as severe in those matters as
he should have been, but on the other hand he may have been as
severe as counsel who now criticize his actions would have been
had they been in his position and had his understanding of the
situation. Perhaps not-it is not important. But the thing that is
important is that Mr. Neylan approved of these purchases of stock
by subsidiaries and of the payment of the money to Star, which of
course necessarily had to be done after the sales were made. I will
not repeat what I have said of his interest in Consolidated and his
devotion to his duties." 56
Where, on the other hand, legal questions arose and the record
did not show that advice of counsel was taken, the courts have adverted to this item as an indication of negligence. This was one of the
bases for the imposition of liability with respect to the granting of a
repurchase option by the defendants in the Guaranty Trust Company
case, where there was no showing either way on the point.57 So in the
Reynolds Investing Company case, the failure to consult counsel regarding an unusual offer for the purchase of stock conditioned upon
the immediate resignation of directors and officers was mentioned as
a ground of directors' liability.58 In the Blaustein case the advice of
counsel taken by the directors of Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Company with reference to the effect of the Texas antitrust laws
upon the policy which they adopted did not satisfy the trial court because he found that the counsel consulted was not independent and had
a personal interest in the transaction; but this view of the matter was
not adopted by the majority of the Appellate Division, who in sus55 Mann v. Hearst, Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County,
1941, not yet reported; p. II3 of memorandum opinion.
56 Id.
57 Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at
699. This type of option, like the resale option, was held to be ultra vires a New
York bank.
58 Gerdes v. Reynolds, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1941) 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 622
at 658.
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taining the action of the directors made a finding that independent
counsel were consulted.69
Directors may in the exercise of due care properly rely in reaching
their conclusions upon information furnished and conclusions expressed
by the management of the corporation, as was held in the Guaranty
Trust Company case.00 In the words of Lord Halsbury, it is not to be
expected of a director "that he should be watching either the inferior
officers of the bank or verifying the calculations of the auditors himself." 61 Another basis for directors' reliance which is turning up more
and more frequently in the more complicated cases is the audit of competent outside accountants. The National City Bank case made clear
that even directors acting in good faith could not safely distribute supplemental compensation to officers upon the basis merely of a net
amount prepared for them by officers and employees who themselves
participated in the distribution, where it turned out that there were
errors in the computation. Failure of the defendants to entrust the computation of the supplemental compensation fund to disinterested persons (said the referee)
"· .. constituted a breach of their duty as directors and subjects
them to liability for the restoration of moneys improperly paid
through such erroneous computations of the management fund." 62
But where directors have taken the precaution to employ independent auditors, they should not be under liability for miscomputations. Justice Valente said in the Loew's Inc. case, distinguishing the
National City Bank case:
". . . In the instant case there was furnished an independent
audit by a firm of certified public accountants. Plaintiffs charge
that this firm was too complacent and adopted the rules suggested
by the parties interested, without using its own judgment. It
would be unreasonable to expect a board of directors to recheck
the work of the independent auditors by still another firm. This
would lead to an endless chain and would be entirely impracticable.
[ After indicating that errors existed in the computation]
"Should the directors be charged with negligence in not discovering the failure to make the deductions which this opinion
59 Blaustein v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., 174 Misc. 601 at
636-637, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 651 (1940), reversed 263 App. Div. 97 at 116-118,
31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941).
60 Litwin v. Allen, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1940) 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 at 719.
61 Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A. C. 477 at 486.
82 Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880 at 893, 281 N. Y. S. 795 (1935).
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directs? In the absence of a showing that their attention was
directed to these matters, it would be too much to expect that they
would do their own re-audit. Nor, of course, could it be expected
that they would consult still another firm to check upon the independent auditors." 68
So on motion for summary judgment by certain directors in the
General Motors Corporation case, the federal court said, with reference to their reliance upon the calculation of an employees' bonus fund
by independent auditors:
". . . These non-participating directors who served on the
Finance Committee were justified in relying on the figures presented by the accounting firm, and they cannot be charged with
either negligence or waste if the accountants' calculations were incorrect, either because the accountants did not adopt the proper
accounting method or practice, or otherwise erred in arriving at the
total of capital employed in the business. These three defendants
did not profit from any errors, assuming the accountants did
err." 6 ¾
It has been suggested that directors are entitled to accept the judgment and advice of their accountants even with reference to computations of capital and surplus entering into the right to declare dividends
on preferred stock,65 despite the authority to the e:ffect that statutory
requirements with respect to dividends are absolute and liability for
violation may exist without fault. 66

F. Judgment of Plaintiffs' Counsel: A Spurious Exception
Where the business judgment rule is really applicable, much of the
attack on defendant directors by stockholders' counsel is predicated on
the implied proposition that failure of the directors to adopt the same
63 Epstein v. Schenck, Special Term, N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J. January 21,
1939, p. 324:4 at 7, not officially reported.
6 !. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 39 F. Supp. 826
at 833. In the decision handed down April 10, 1942, after trial {not yet reported),
the court departed substantially from this principle, upon a finding that the nonrecipient directors made independent decisions of policy, which were disapproved.
65 Gallagher v. New York Dock Co., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1940) 19 N. Y. S. {2d)
789 at 807 (1940), affd. 263 App. Div. 878, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1942).
66 Quintal v. Greenstein, 142 Misc. 854, 256 N. Y. S. 462 (1932), affd. 236
App. Div. 719, 257 N. Y. S. 1034 (1932). In this action to recover a dividend paid
from capital in violation of the statute, the court struck out defenses of good faith, including reliance on auditors. In Gallagher v. New York Dock Co., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1940)
19 N. Y. S. {2d) 789, affd. 263 App. Div. 878, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1942),
on the other hand, the court found that there were earnings available for dividends.
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standards of care and judgment that counsel do is a ground of liability.
Fortunately this proposition is not true. Plaintiffs' counsel have the inestimable advantage of hindsight. By the nature of their employment
they know which side to take and what decision ought to have been
made. Counsel dealing with defendant directors must remember that
the latter are not expected to attain the standard of prudence and foresight attained by counsel themselves; for otherwise, instead of being
merely directors, they would be members of the bar. A federal judge
in Kentucky, in passing on the liability of directors of a national bank
for mismanagement, pointed out the difficulty of ascertaining the "reasonably prudent person" whom the law takes as the standard to determine the negligence of directors. He said:

"· .. Now, in my opinion, it is probable that the trier of the
facts, in such a case, whether he be judge or juror, thinks, perhaps
unconsciously, of himself as a reasonably prudent individual. ...
The natural impulse of the judge trying such a case is to expect
and demand a high degree of care on the part of such a bank
director and to believe that the ordinary bank director is, as the
judge is likely to conceive that he himself would be ( and perhaps in fact would be) a very careful, conservative, prudent
director. It is only natural for a judge to think of himself as a
bank director of this ultraconservative type, rather than as a director of the average, ordinary type. He may forget that membership on a board of directors of a large city bank such as is involved
here is usually and normally only one of many business activities
in which such director is engaged. It may be thought that such a
directorship is of sufficient importance to demand that the director
give to it all of his thought, energy, and time, but that this is not
the usual or ordinary practice is a fact of such general knowledge
that the court must take judicial notice of it." 67
This language suggests the further thought that conformity of the
directors' judgment with the opinion of the court itself is neither a
necessary nor a proper test of due care. Judicial standards are not those
of corporate management, and it would be a departure from his duty
for a director to look at the questions presented to him for decision in
the way a court is required to do.
67
Anderson v. Akers, (D. C. Ky. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 924 at 929-930, Tuttle, D. J.,
reversed on other grounds, Atherton v. Anderson, (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) 86 F. (2d)
518, reversed and remanded, Anderson v. Atherton, 302 U. S. 643, 58 S. Ct. 53
(1937).
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III
APPLICATIONS OF BusrnEss JUDGMENT RuLE
Every derivative action against directors in which the plaintiff is
unable to show fraud, diversion of corporate property, negligence, violation of statute, ultra vires or the like, and which is therefore dismissed, is in a sense an application of the business judgment rule. However, there are some applications of special interest.

A. Executive Compensation
The determination of the proper compensation of employees, more
particularly of officers vital to the success of the corporation, lies peculiarly within the sphere of the good judgment and discretion of the
directors. This conclusion is the result of an attack vigorously pressed
by minority stockholders upon the compensation policies of the larger
corporations since 193 r.
In the case of small companies, there had previously been a number
of decisions holding the compensation of executives as fixed by the
directors under varying circumstances to be reasonable in some cases,
unreasonable in others. In all, Professor Washington in his book Corporate Executives' Compensation 68 has collected forty-four of these
decisions affecting small corporations. Of these, twenty-seven held the
compensation reasonable, seventeen unreasonable. From a study of the
cases, Professor Washington concludes that they furnish no clear line
for classification of a given amount of compensation as reasonable or
unreasonable, no definite ratio between the executives' salary and corporate earnings or any other figure. The figures of compensation held
reasonable varied from $1500 to $24,800; those held unreasonable
varied from $3600 to $29,076. The ultimate basis of decision where
compensation was held unreasonable was, in the author's opinion, the
bad faith of the defendants involved; apparently all but one of the
seventeen cases determining compensation unreasonable involved selfdealing. 69
The first of the large corporations to have its compensation policies
attacked by minority stockholders was Bethlehem Steel Corporation, of
which four stockholders in 1931 sued in the New Jersey court for a
return of bonuses paid and an injunction against further payments.70
68

Page 250 (1942).

258 (1942).
Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148, 154 A. 321 (1931),
granting a preliminary injunction against the holding of a stockholders' meeting to
ratify the acts of the management.
69 WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION
70
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In 1933 in the first American Tobacco case, Rogers v. Hill,11 the
Supreme Court held that certain bonuses paid to officers of the American Tobacco Company, upon the basis of net profits fixed by a by-law
adopted in I 912, were so large as to warrant investigation in equity
to ascertain whether such bonuses bore a real relationship to services
rendered. The largest amounts of bonus mentioned in the opinion were
$447,870.30 in 1929 and $842,507.72 in 1930. Following this indication the New York court in the National City Bank case also held that
certain of the figures of executive compensation there appearing were so
large as to warrant judicial review, but took pains to add:
"· .. The inquiry is not merely to substitute the court's discretion for the discretion of the directors, if that has been honestly
and fairly exercised." 72
So in the General Motors case, Judge Leibell on a preliminary motion
indicated that those executives who from the period 1930 on received
salary and bonus together exceeding $250,000 might upon a trial be
found to have been overpaid. He granted the moving defendants summary judgment as to all except those persons, who were about eighteen
in number.78 This again did not indicate liability in respect of the compensation of those persons.74 Still less did it mean that in all companies
and under all circumstances $250,000 would be an allowable limit for
executive compensation on an annual basis.
Curiously enough, none of the cases which have sought to review
in equity the propriety of large amounts of compensation to corporate
executives have resulted in a recovery upon this basis. Where recoveries have been had, they have been had on other grounds. The questions of compensation sent to the referee, Judge Laughlin, in the
71
289 U. S. 582, 53 S. Ct. 731 (1933), approving the dissenting opinion of
Judge Swan in (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 109 at 113.
72
Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679 at 706, 273 N. Y. S. 87 (1934).
Compensation of the chief executive in three of the years exceeded $1,000,000. At
152 Misc. 703 Dore, J., summarizes the possible factors affecting the amount of executive compensation, and at pp. 706-707 the decisions dealing with the right of directors
acting as a body in good faith to fix compensation for services.
78
Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 39 F. Supp. 369.
H In his decision after a full trial, Leibell, J., held that compensation to the
executives of General Motors Corporation runnning up to $500,000 annually was not
excessive in view of the testimony as to their services and the failure of plaintiffs to
indicate any alternative measure of compensation. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.,
April 10, 1942, not yet reported. The court said with respect to certain compensation
on a scale running up to $ I ,000,000 annually, recovery of which was barred by the
1tatnte of limitations, that he would otherwise be inclined to hold that it was so
large as to constitute a waste of corporate assets.
'
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National City Bank case were resolved in favor of the defendants; it
was held that none of the defendants authorized or permitted the payment of compensation so great as to constitute a gift or waste of corporate funds. 75 In the second American Tobacco case Justice Collins in
picturesque language announced his inability to fix a standard other
than that adopted by the directors with respect to the amounts of compensation for services due to five officers of the company who received,
in the form of salary and bonus together, amounts of compensation ranging around $200,000 in most cases but running up sometimes to
$1,000,000 in the case of the president. The court said:
"· .. It is not timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for revising these figures were I inclined to do so ....
"Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even grapple with these entangled economic problems ...• Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by its [sic] directors, with
the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is
reasonable compensation for its officers is primarily for the stockholders.
". . . In the circumstances, if a ceiling for these bonuses is to
be erected, the stockholders who built and are responsible for the
present structure must be the architects." 76
This decision was followed in the California case involving Hearst
Consolidated Publications, Inc., where the trial court found that $500,000 a year paid to the principal executive with the approval of the
board over a period of seven years was not unreasonable and, though
more critical of the amounts received in relation to services by the sons
of this executive, refused to impose liability in respect of them also. 77
The New York court upon the evidence held the compensation received by executives of Bethlehem Steel Corporation in amounts aver75

Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880 at 887-891, 281 N. Y. S. 795
(1935).
76 Heller v. Boylan, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term, 1941) 29 N. Y. S. {2d) 653 at
679, 680, a.ff'd. (App. Div. 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 131. The total of Mr. Hill's
executive compensation over the period 1929-1939 was about $6,500,000. Mr. Hill
made the continuance of the bonus system of American Tobacco Company a condition
of his continuance with the company, in communications to the stockholders during
l 940-1942; and the stockholders' votes sustained the bonus system. WASHINGTON,
CoRPORATE ExECUTivEs' CoMPENSATION 276-277 (1942); NEW YoRK TIMES, April
2, 1942, p. 37:1.
77
Mann v. Hearst, Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, Sept. 1941,
Shinn, J., not yet reported.
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aging up to $200,000 a year and in one case $798,000 a year, under a
bonus plan, was reasonable and not excessive.78 In the stockholder's
suit involving Loew's Inc. the New York court held that there was no
showing of improvidence on the part of directors in providing for percentage compensation to three executives which gave them twenty per
cent on the first $2,500,000 of profits computed after certain deductions and fifteen per cent thereafter .19 In the stockholders' action involving the United States Rubber Company a plan of supplemental
compensation, including a stock option to one of the principal executives, was sustained on summary judgment as a proper exercise of the
discretion of directors. 80
So in the action involving Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. a federal
court in Delaware sustained a settlement of a stockholders' derivative
action against the directors in respect of compensation to three executives jointly in the amount of $ ro,ooo a week for a six-year contract
together with 90,000 shares of stock alleged to have been worth
$r2,ooo,ooo at the time of issuance in r928, and also held that executive compensation in this amount was not as a matter of law a waste of
corporate assets. 81 Following this decision a federal court in Maryland
sustained the action of the directors of National Cash Register Company in voting the principal executive an annual salary of $roo,ooo for
only a part of his time and in addition an option to purchase 50,000
shares of stock at a price which ( in view of subsequent market levels)
made available to him a theoretical profit of $r,4ro,ooo. Judge Coleman's opinion, recognizing that a salary of $ roo,ooo appears to the
average person to be more than liberal compensation, remarks that
"courts are not permitted to be ·controlled by this test any more than
by what the average judge, familiar with cases of the present kind,
might himself conclude to be adequate compensation." 82
The result of the authorities seems to be that, despite the rule to
18 Cwerdinski v:. Bent, Special Term N. Y. County, Valente, J., N. Y. L. J.,
Dec. 26, 1941, p. 2129:4, not yet officially reported.
79 Epstein v. Schenck, Special Term N. Y. County, Valente, J., N. Y. L, J.
January 21, 1939, p. 324:4, not officially reported. There was substantial evidence of
stockholders' approval, and regard was paid to the high rate of compensation in the
cinema industry.
so Diamond v. Davis, Jr., Special Term N. Y. County, Hammer, J., N. Y. L. J.
Feb. 14, 1942, p. 686:1. Ratification by the stockholders was also a basis of the
decision.
SI. Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, (D. C. Del. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 173 at 188.
82 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., (D. C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp.
639 at 653, affirmed, (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 877, cert. denied, 3II U.S.
695, 61 S. Ct. 140 (1941).
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the effect that executive compensation of a certain size in relation to the
apparent effort and responsibility imposed will warrant an investigation
in equity,83 directors exercising their judgment disinterestedly cannot
be made liable to minority stockholders merely by virtue of the size of·
the compensation granted to executives. At least, no decision is known
in which liability in such circumstances has been predicated merely upon
the size of executive compensation approved by disinterested defendants. Liability, where imposed, is usually imposed upon the basis of
self-dealing. 8 ¼
Liability in cases involving alleged unreasonableness of e~ecutive
compensation is also imposed where tJ:ie amount is not controlled by the
independent judgment of directors. Thus the basis of the liability found
in the National City Bank case was that while the distribution of management fund was made by disinterested directors, the computation
thereof was delegated by them to interested officers and employees and
the computation was erroneous. 85 In the Loew's Inc. case, distinguishing that decision, the court held that the certificate of outside accountants protected the nonrecipient directors from liability for errors found
to exist in the computation of a-profit-sharing fund, but imposed liability upon the recipients as to three items erroneously computed.86
Where plans of supplemental compensation are related to corporate earnings, questions of accountancy in the ascertainment of the earnings necessarily arise; and it is not unusual for minority stockholders,
employing on a contingent basis attorneys who retain accountants on
the same basis, to endeavor to bring into court the finer questions of
88 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 at 591, 53 S. Ct. 731 (1933); Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 39 F. Supp. 826 at 833; Gallin v. National
City Bank, 152 Misc. 679 at 703, 273 N. Y. S. 87 (1934).
s<1o This is the result of the analysis of the decisions affecting small companies by
WASHINGTON, CoRPORATE ExECUTIVEs' CoMPENSATION 258 (1942). A case cited by
him, Dwight v. Williams, 25 Misc. 667, 55 N. Y. S. 201 (1898), is a possible exception to the statement contained in the preceding sentence of the text.
85 Gallin v. National City Bank, 155 Misc. 880 at 892-902, 281 N. Y. S. 795
(1935).
86 Epstein ·v. Schenck, Special Term N. Y. County, Valente, J., N. Y. L. J.,
January 21, 1939, p. 324:4, not officially reported. The court refused to restate the
profit-sharing account in other respects where the issue involved accounting methods
about which there was a fair difference of opinion. The same judge later dismissed for
insufficiency certain matters complained of by another stockholder in connection with
the same profit-sharing contracts, where the allegations of the complaint did not sufficiently negative the proper exercise of business judgment by directors on accounting
questions. Gottlieb v. Schenck, Special Term New York County., Valente, J., N. Y. L.
J., March 3, 1942, p. 930:7, not yet officially reported.
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accounting theory and found a representative judgment against directors on the judge's arbitrament of these matters. In such cases, the
interplay of directors' business judgment with the certificate of independent accountants as to the correctness of the accounting practices followed opens new opportunities for the making of distinctions. 87
Undoubtedly these distinctions will be resolved in the sense of the business judgment rule as outlined in existing decisions.
One of the most scholastic of the refinements yet raised by minority
stockholders seeking perfectibility with the aid of accountants retained
on a contingent basis has been whether bonuses computed on a basis
of profit-sharing must themselves be deducted as an expense of the
business in determining the bonus base. 88 The attempt to bring up for
judicial review such niceties of accountancy shows as well as anything
else the great importance, first of a strict application of principles of
business judgment by directors to these questions, and second of strict
enforcement by the courts of the business judgment rule.

B. .Necessity of Determination of Liability Before an
Accounting
The right of directors to be exonerated in respect of the proper
exercise of the discretion delegated to them by the stockholders means
that they should not be required to account in equity until a case has
been made establishing a prima facie liability on their part for violation
of this rule. This does not mean that they cannot be sued without a
87 See Diamond v. Davis, Jr., Special Term N. Y. County, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 14,
1942, p. 686:1 granting summary judgment against the plaintiffs; Gottlieb v. Schenck,
Special Term New York County, N. Y. L. J., March 3, 1942, p. 930:7, dismissing the
complaint in part for insufficiency. See on the other hand the opinion in Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y., April IO, 1942), Leibell, J., not yet reported,
holding liable for miscomputation both directors who received part of the compensation fund and directors who received none, with respect to some items where accounting practices followed had the approval of independent public accountants and of a
majority of disinterested directors. In other items of the recovery the court found that
there was self-dealing.
88 Epstein v. Schenck, Special Term, New York County, N. Y. L. J., January 21,
1939, p. 324:4, not officially reported, and Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.,
(D. C. N. Y. April 10, 1942), Leibell, J., not yet reported, both held that such
deduction need not be made from the bonus base. In each case independent public
accountants approved the practice followed. Heller v. Boylan, (N. Y. Co. Spec. Term,
1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 653 at 692, 704, affd. (App. Div. 1941) 32 N._Y. S. (2d)
13 I, held that the bonus should have been deducted as an operating expense like
salary, the Supreme Court having held compensation under that particular bonus plan
to be an operating expense, Rogers v. Hill, 289 U. S. 582 at 590, 53 S. Ct. 731
(1933), and the item not having been audited by outside accountants.
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prior determination of their liability. It does mean that they cannot be
made to account before a referee or master until wrongdoing has been
established. This rule has recently been applied by tJ;ie appellate courts
in New York in reversing interlocutory judgments in stockholders'
actions. 89
•
The same principle requires the granting of summary judgment
to defendant directors where the plaintiff stockholder is unable to show
the existence of facts which would make the business judgment rule
inoperative. In such situations summary judgment is granted equally in
the state and in the federal courts. 90 Where the plaintiff stockholder
could show a triable issue as to whether the directors exercised an independent discretion, summary judgment has been denied. 91

C. Prior Demand
Since a claim for mismanagement or ,waste of corporate assets is
itself a corporate asset, the business judgment rule requires that the
giving of opportunity for suit to the board of directors of a corporation
is a prerequisite to the exercise of equity jurisdiction at the suit of a
minority stockholder, unless either the directors have wrongfully refused to bring suit or a demand upon them to do so would be futile.
This principle was applied by the United States Supreme Court from
the beginning, in the protection of its discretion against collusive suits;
it has been embodied in the equity rules since I 8 8 I ; and it now appears
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure approved by the Supreme
Court in 1937.92
In view of the enormous multiplication of derivative actions in
recent years, it is refreshing to. hear the words of the Supreme Court
spoken in I 8 8 I on the necessity of prior demand. The case was in
89 Moriarty v. James Butler Grocery Co., 261 App. Div. 20, ·24 N. Y. S. (2d)
105 (1940), affd. 286 N. Y. 687, 37 N. E. (2d) 36 (1941); Leigh v. Wasey, 259
App. Div. 594, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 301 (1940).
90 Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (D. C. Del. 1941) 41 F. Supp.
334; Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 39 F. Supp. 826,
partial summary judgment; Diamond v. Davis, Jr., Special Term N. Y. County, N. Y.
L. J., Feb. 14, 1942, p. 686:1.
91 Levine v. Behn, 282 N. Y. 120, 25 N. E. (2d) 871 (1941). Upon the trial
the defendant directors received judgment upon a finding that in paying out of corporate funds a claim which was not legally due, they reasonably believed they were promoting the interests of the corporation. 174 Misc. 988, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 805 (1940),
affd. 262 App. Div. 729, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 7n (1941), leave to appeal denied, 262
App. Div. 845, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 146 (1941).
92 -Rule 23(b); see note 3, supra, and Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 at 460461 (1881).
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equity in a United States court for California by a citizen of New York
as stockholder in a California corporation, alleging that the directors
had wrongfully permitted the corporation to give the City of Oakland
free water for all municipal purposes whereas it was entitled only to
receive free water in cases of fire or other emergency. The court said:
"· .. The directors are better able to act understandingly on
this subject than a stockholder residing in New York. The great
body of the stockholders residing in Oakland or other places in
California may take this view of it, and be content to abide by the
action of their directors.
"If this be so, is a bitter litigation with the city to be conducted
by one stockholder for the corporaticm and all other stockholders,
because the amount of his dividends is diminished?
"This question answers itself...." 93
It has been suggested that this rule is not wholly one of procedure
and that as a rule of substantive law 94 it must yield to the law of the
state in which the federal court sits, under the principle of Erie R. R.
v. Tompkins. 95 That contention has not yet been adopted by the federal
courts. The conclusions reached in all the lower federal courts that
Rule 23(b), as having been promulgated by the same Court which
decided Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, must be deemed controlling until the
Supreme Court otherwise decides. 96
Even the federal rule will not of course require prior demand
where the directors are shown not to be free agents, as has been decided in some recent cases. 97 On the other hand, the principle of prior
demand applies by virtue of judicial decision in the New York courts.
The Appellate Division, First Department, has very recently reversed
93 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 at 462 (1881). The court adverts to the
business judgment rule as laid down in the English cases from the beginning in Foss
v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. l 89 ( l 843).
9 ~ Cf. Jacobson v. General Motors Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 255,
dealing with both prior demand and contemporaneous ownership.
95 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
96 Summers v. Hearst, (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 986 at 992; Piccard v.
Sperry Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 1006, affd. (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 120
F. (2d) 328; Gallup v. Caldwell, (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 90 at 95.
97 Cohen v. Industrial Finance Corp., (D. C. N. Y. Jan. 16, 1942), Leibell, J.,
not yet reported; Dederick v. North American Co., (D. C. N. Y. March 17, 1942),
Bright, J., not yet reported. A similar holding in Winkelman v. Gener~ Motors Corp.,
(D. C. N. Y., April IO, 1942), Leibell, J., not yet reported, with reference to one
transaction which was not questioned until the trial and which the majority of the
board did not know about, goes to the extreme limit in making an exception to
Rule 23(b).
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an interlocutory judgment against directors and dismissed the action
for the reason, in part, that no prior demind was made upon the board
of directors, of which a majority was disinterested. 98 Such a rule necessarily follows from the rule of substantive law well established in New
York that directors exercising a disinterested discretion may properly
surrender even a valid claim of the corporation or pay out of corporate
funds an i~valid claim against it.99

IV
SoME CoNCLUSIONs

The courts generally recognize that the application ,of the business
judgment rule, which of course includes as a part.the exceptions I have
described, is essential to the maintenance of private enterprise. Just as it
is vital to any system that fraud and other abuse be punished by the
courts at the suit of a part owner of the enterprise, so it is indispensable
that within the area of their competence and in the exercise of their
functions boards of directors be free from judicial review or from the
requirement that their determination in matters entrusted to them
yield to the determination of others. While, as I have said, this general
idea meets with universal acceptance, the first thing which strikes one
in reading the cases is the immense burden which the courts have to
sustain in applying the rule. Too many cases reach trial in which the
plaintiff stockholder's real complaint is that the directors were mistaken
in their judgment. Every member of the bar with any experience will
share, I believe, my general impression that three-quarters of the derivative actions brought are without foundation in the light of the business judgment rule, and result in no recovery. In the remaining onequarter of the cases where some recovery is achieved, one-half or more
of the matters complained of, by a generous computation, also fall
within the area of reaspnable business judgment and should never have
been made the subject of suit.
The result is that in: applying the business judgment rule the courts_
are subject_ed to a terrific burden in reviewing immense records of cor98 Moriarty v. James Butler Grocery Co., 261 App. Div. 20 at 24, 24 N. Y. S.
(2d) 105 (1940), affd. 286 N. Y. 687, 37 N. E. (2d) 36 (1941). See also Chance
v. Guaranty Trust Co., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 412 at 427.
99 Koch v. Estes, 146 Misc. 249, 262 N. Y. S. 23 (1933), affd. 240 App. Div.
829, 266 N. Y. S. 1008· (1933), 264 N. Y. 480, 191 N. E. 525 (1934); Koral v.
Savory, 276 N. Y. 215, II N. E. (2d) 883 (1939); Levine v. Behn, 174 Misc. 988,
21 N. Y.-S; (2d) 805 (1940), affd. 262 App. Div. 729", 28 N .Y. S. (2d) 711
(1941), leave to appeal denied 262 App. Div. 845, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 146 (1941).
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porate action which should not be before them at all. The long opinions
recently handed down in complex stockholders' suits constantly call
the attention of the bar to this fact. In the Blaustein case, for example,
we are informed that the record comprised rn,63 I pages in addition to
2,686 pages of examination before trial, and that there were 2,900
pages of briefs. In the Hoe & Co. case there were 6,000 pages of testimony and only 800 pages of briefs. In the General Motors case there
were 6,733 pages of testimony and about 750 pages of briefs. In the
Hearst Consolidated Publications case there were 5,58 I pages of testimony, u,482 pages of depositions, and 3,000 pages of briefs. I spare
you the number and extent of the exhibits in these ambitious litigations.100
It is perfectly apparent from these figures that the review of corporate management which, despite the business judgment rule, is im. posed upon the courts by the nature of the allegations that minority
stockholders feel justified in making in their pleadings has proved to be
a crushing labor. In passing, it is of interest to note how the New York
and federal procedures have developed divergent techniques for dealing
with this situation. The new federal rules contemplate informal and
elastic pleadings, liberal examinations, and the use of summary judgment for disposition of unjust claims. The New Yark practice, on the
other hand, has insisted upon a statement in the pleading of facts sufficient to show a breach of fiduciary obligation, the failure to exercise
disinterested business judgment. This established rule has been adhered
to with rigor in recent years by the New York courts as the flood of
derivative actions becomes more impressive.101 So far have the state
courts carried this rule that they refuse an examination before trial upon
mere general statements of alleged wrongdoing in a derivative action.102
We can at present only note these divergent tendencies. It will be interesting to see how they will develop.
It is, of course, not my province here to suggest remedies for the
100 Reference is made respectively to Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &
Transport Co., 174 Misc. 601 at 604, 2! N. Y. S. (2d) 651 (1940), reversed 263
App. Div. 97, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1941); Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co., (N. Y. S.
Ct. 1941) 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 412 at 415; Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., (D. C.
N. Y. April 10, 1942), Leibell, J., not yet reported; Mann v. Hearst, Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, Sept. 1941, Shinn, J., not yet reported.
101 Gerdes v. Reynolds, 281 N. Y. 180, 22 N. E. (2d) 331 (1939); Lifshutz v.
Adams, 285 N. Y. 180, 33 N. E. (2d) 83 (1941); Rous v. Carlisle, 261 App. Div.
432, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 197 (1940); Davis v. Cohn, 260 App. Div. 624, 23 N. Y. S.
(2d) 104 (1939).
102 Price v. Groves, 258 App. Div. 35, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 532 (1939).
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evils which we all recognize to inhere in the present conduct of derivative actions. As the chairman of a New York company said to his stockholders last year, the problem still awaits a solution. The solution required is one which, while leaving a free judicial review for corporate
transactions which pass beyond the business judgment rule, yet will
produce a more automatic application of that rule so as to save from
harassment and expense the directors entitled to its protection, from
pre-emption and overwork the courts who are asked to review the
business judgment of directors. A single idea that has been suggested
in this direction I will mention, bee::ause it would seem to me as effective
to close Pandora's box as the rule of Lord Lyndhurst was instrumental
in opening it.
You will recall that in Hichens v. Congreve 103 the jurisdiction of
equity in a grievous situation was predicated upon the unreasonableness
of asking that two hundred or more shareholders concur in separate
suits, each for his aliquot part of £15,000 abstracted by the defendants.
The noble lord would certainly not have intended that this principle
of decision, perfectly just for an obvious case, become a universal rule
of representative action by which a minority stockholder, no matter
how tiny, might draw into the courts corporate transactions no matter
how vast, to be determined upon considerations no matter how finespun and ambiguous. The hypertrophy to which the stockholder's
action has come inverts it from its original function. It can be restored
perhaps by taking from the minuter aggregations of shares the abused
privilege of representation. Should the principle be established, by rule
or by statute, that a block of shares aggregating five per cent or less of
the total outstanding stock of the company could not sue the directors
on behalf of the corporation without the previous assent of a majority
of the stock, at a special meeting called for that purpose, but would be
restricted to a suit for its proportion of the loss alleged, there is reason
to believe that we should soon have a healthier state of affairs in the
field of derivative actions, and a readier and simpler application of the
business rule.
103

4 Russ. 562, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828), discussed at note

1,
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